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The particular pattern the bureaucratic development in Turkey has evinced suggests that le-
gal rationality is a prerequisite for the successful institutionalization of rational productiv-
ity. Whereas there is a zero-sum type of relationship between patrimonialism on one hand
and legal rationality and rational productivity on the other, there is a positive-sum type of re-
lationship between legal rationality and rational productivity.
IS LEGAL-RATIONAL BUREAUCRACY
A PREREQUISITE FOR A RATIONAL-
PRODUCTIVE BUREAUCRACY?




THEORETICAL BACKDROP AND A HYPOTHESIS
Three ideal types of bureaucracy—(a) patrimonial bureaucracy and (b)
legal-rational bureaucracy, both formulated by Weber (1978, pp. 212-
241),1 and (c) rational-productive bureaucracy defined by Ilchman
(1969)2—have had a better fit with the general lines of political evolution
in the Anglo-American polities than elsewhere.3 The transformation of
patrimonial bureaucracy into legal-rational bureaucracy took place fol-
lowing the substitution of the supremacy of parliament for those of the
king and his bureaucracy. In the wake of this evolution, bureaucrats began
to owe obedience to a legal impersonal order established by parliament
(Diamant, 1962, p. 88). Each office came to have a defined competence
and an administrative staff; the latter was to carry out its duties with a view
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to broad guidelines determined, to use Riggs’ (1969) terminology, by the
“constitutive system,” that is, elected assembly, electoral system, and
party system (p. 17).
Later, rational-productive bureaucracy emerged as a result of the
increased complexity of social and economic issues and the advanced lev-
els of knowledge needed to tackle those issues (Ilchman, 1969, pp. 476-
478). The common bond that joined rational-productive bureaucrats
derived essentially from their legitimating source in knowledge, their loy-
alty to substantive programs, and their value commitment to productivity.
The rational-productive bureaucrat differed from the legal-rational
bureaucrat in that whereas the latter basically placed emphasis on effi-
ciency—to carry out a policy or program with least cost—the former was
interested in policies and programs based on expertise and in effective-
ness—the ability to carry out those policies or programs. The rational-
productive bureaucrat differed from the legal-rational bureaucrat in
another dimension, too: Whereas politics was the source of law for the
legal-rational bureaucrat, the rational-productive bureaucrat claimed
expertise often superior to that of the politician. Consequently, the
rational-productive bureaucrat engaged, tacitly or actively, in the “politics
of antipolitics,” or politically unresponsive behavior (Ilchman, 1969, p.
476).
This proclivity to politics of antipolitics, however, did not lead bureau-
crats in the Anglo-American settings to have a condescending attitude
toward politicians. Although they insisted that technically they them-
selves were well equipped to make the most rational decisions, they never-
theless granted that politicians had the last word. In contrast, historically
the Bonapartist bureaucracy in France and theRechtsstaatbureaucracy in
Prussia-Germany tended to emphasize “substantive” rather than “instru-
mental rationality” (Heper, 1985a); they thought that on the whole, they
themselves, rather than politicians, could come up with better policies and
programs and, therefore, should have the last word on these matters.4 For
instance, in 19th-century France, guided by the idea of the general inter-
est, bureaucrats perceived themselves as the true agents of a neutral
state—a state that was powerful, functional, and set apart from civil soci-
ety and its political representatives (Birnbaum, 1987). During the same
century, in Prussia, the bureaucratic ethic came to embody the idea of the
political neutrality of a state represented by its civil servants, and its supe-
riority to social interests and the assemblies representing them (Southern,
1979, pp. 110-140).
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During the 20th century, bureaucrats in both France and Germany
became more political (Dyson, 1977, pp. 57-58; Suleiman, 1974,
pp. 181ff). Still, in both countries bureaucrats continued to have greater
autonomy than their counterparts in the Anglo-American settings. This
situation led rational-productive bureaucracies in France and Germany to
tend toward politics of antipolitics to a greater extent than bureaucrats in
the United States and United Kingdom. Yet, because of their (partial)
“politicization,” bureaucrats in France and Germany, too, increasingly
evinced characteristics ofresponsivecompetence rather thaneutral
competence, that is, expert, objective performance of one’s functions
without much regard to political party or other loyalties.5 However,
bureaucrats in France and Germany became more open to political direc-
tives as well.
All in all, the phenomenon of responsive competence has been a conse-
quence of a successful marriage between two bureaucratic tradi-
tions—legal rationality and rational productivity—that one came across
in the Anglo-American and recently in the French and German settings.
The legal-rational tradition brought with it the notions of an objective
assessment of merit (as efficiency) and political responsiveness; the
rational-productivity tradition added to the above formula the notions of
substantive rationality and effectiveness.
We would like to suggest that the legal-rational tradition constituted a
critical prerequisite for the development and institutionalization of
rational-productive bureaucracy that does not evince characteristics of
either patrimonialism or antipolitics. For one, because political respon-
siveness was one of its basic characteristics, the legal-rational tradition
moderated the antipolitics tendency inherent in rational productivity and
prevented that tendency from developing into political unresponsiveness.
Second, because impersonal order and the resultant objective assessment
of merit constituted its other basic characteristics, the legal-rationality tra-
dition was instrumental in the maintenance within the framework of
rational-productive bureaucracy, too, of the notion of an objective assess-
ment of merit that was not intermingled with patrimonial practices—that
is, nonobjective criteria creeping into the assessment of merit.
The particular way the bureaucracy in the Ottoman-Turkish polity
evolved lends credence to our suggestion that legal-rational tradition is a
prerequisite for rational productivity that is untainted by patrimonialism.
A successful marriage of the two bureaucratic traditions—legal rational-
ity and rational productivity—could not be consummated in the case of
the Ottoman-Turkish bureaucracy. In that polity, an attempt was made to
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transform the patrimonial bureaucracy into a rational-productive bureaucracy
without first successfully transforming it into a legal-rational one. This led
to the emergence of some rational-productive features in the bureaucracy,
but they were accompanied with patrimonial characteristics. The result
was the fragility of rational productivity of the economic bureaucracy.6
The degeneration of the rational productivity of that bureaucracy had a
high probability, and that degeneration did take place. The present article
takes up the relevant developments in the Ottoman-Turkish bureaucracy.
THE EVOLUTION OF THE OTTOMAN-TURKISH
BUREAUCRACY UP TO THE 1980s
Until recently, the Ottoman-Turkish bureaucracy had been even more
Bonapartist than the French and Prussian-German bureaucracies. From
the 19th century onward, the bureaucracy in the Ottoman-Turkish polity
aspired to represent a state that was more autonomous from civil society
than the state in France and Germany.
In France, from the 9th century onward, there was a constant tug-of-
war between the local grandees and the king (Finer, 1975, p. 126). In late
18th-century France, the localparlementseffectively challenged the taxing
powers of the kings (Blanning, 1987, p. 29; Myers, 1975, pp. 136-141).
Similarly, the state in Prussia-Germany was confronted by a largely self-
governing aristocracy. In that polity, too, the central authority did not
come to have virtually unlimited powers (Rosenberg, 1958, pp. 137ff;
Taylor, 1945, p. 21).
In contrast, in the Ottoman Empire the localities did not have autono-
mous powers. During the earlier centuries, drawing on their unchallenged
sovereign powers, the Ottoman sultans had a dominating presence in the
polity. The Ottoman local notables did not develop into an aristocracy able
to impinge on the affairs of the center. Under the Ottoman fief (tymar) sys-
tem, the granting of benefice in return for service to the sultan did not
bring with it extensive political-territorial rights. In the Ottoman Empire,
the political realm was, in fact, identical with a huge sultanic manor. The
Ottomans opted for a royal household full of slaves—recruited from
among the non-Muslim subjects of the empire and educated about and
socialized into the norms of the state. By the successful deployment of the
members of this group to the critical posts both at the center and the locali-
ties, the Ottomans were able to maintain a centralized system of govern-
ment. With the disappearance from the scene of sultans with dominant
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personalities, particularly during the mid-19th century, the bureaucracy
amassed virtually unlimited powers (Heper, 1980, pp. 82ff).
Both in the 19th and 20th centuries, efforts were made to render this
bureaucracy into a legal-rational one. In the 19th century, it was stressed
that the behavior of officials should be governed by impersonal rules. Effi-
ciency and regularity of administration was considered indispensable for
the proper functioning of the state. Various regulations sought to introduce
formal organizational and procedural patterns. New titles, precedence,
and tables of rank were attributed to offices rather than persons (Cham-
bers, 1964; Findley, 1980; Weiker, 1968). In the 20th century, Atatürk, the
founder in 1923 of Turkish Republic, was the initiator of the reforms that
aimed at eliminating personal rule. Atatürk viewed bureaucracy as a mere
instrument—an organization structured on the principle of strict hierarchy
and staffed by civil servants acting in accordance with the letter of the law
(Heper, 1984; Mardin, 1975). In the following decades, administrative
reforms aimed at a more rational distribution of functions, the institution
of hierarchical controls, more extensive (legal) regulation of the activities
of the bureaucracy, a better coordination among administrative agencies,
and the like (Dodd, 1965).
However, in the absence of a politically influential economic middle
class7 that would have effectively demanded a more predictable political
environment and efficient performance of governmental functions and
policies, these endeavors did not meet with success. The Ottoman
bureaucracy did not operate within the framework of impersonal rules and
regulations. Both the sultans and the bureaucratic elite, who doubled as
minisultans, placed emphasis on loyalty rather than merit. Among other
things, the earlier practice of sons and relatives following in the footsteps
of their sponsors continued (Heper, 1979). Patrimonialism carried the day
during the Republican period, too. One came across overlapping jurisdic-
tions; the complexity of, and confusion in, the relevant legal system; and a
lack of trust toward subordinates (Heper, 1979; Presthus, 1961). As late as
1972, of all the newly hired civil servants, 31% was not subjected to any
kind of examination, and another 30% started work to fulfill their obliga-
tory service to the state (¤dari Reform DanÕma Kurulu, 1972, pp. 157-
158).
All in all, the lingering patrimonialism in the Ottoman-Turkish
bureaucracy was basically due to the fact that, until the transition to multi-
party politics in the mid-1940s, the bureaucratic elite constituted part of
the ruling strata (Evin, 1996, p. 49). Consequently, their functions could
not be distinguished from those of politicians, and proper criteria for
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entrance to bureaucratic posts could not be institutionalized. In the multi-
party period, too, at least until the 1970s, the bureaucratic elites kept alive
their aspirations to act as the state elite responsible for the long-term inter-
ests of the community.
More specifically, during the Republican period, the bureaucratic elite
considered themselves as the guardians of the Republican norms, or the
Atatürkian principles,8 and remained staunchly Bonapartist until at least
the transition to multiparty politics in the 1940s. For them, law was impor-
tant only as a means to maintain their own autonomy from political elites;
when a higher civil servant was removed from a significant administrative
post, he or she could apply to the (bureaucratically staffed) Council of
State (the highest administrative court—the Turkish version of French
Conseil D’Etat), and quite often he or she would be reinstated in his or her
previous post. The Council provided a secure bulwark against “politi-
cians’ encroachments to bureaucrats’ turf” (Heper, 1985b, p. 70).
The bureaucratic elite tended to ignore the constitutional principle that
granted final authority to politicians. They considered the guardianship of
the Atatürkian principles as more important than the efficient implemen-
tation of policies preferred by politicians. In 1969, all of the 36 retired
higher civil servants disagreed with the statement that “to alleviate some
of the tensions and bottlenecks in Turkish political life it might perhaps be
wise in political debates to compromise on some tenets of Atatürkism like
secularism, nationalism, andétatism” (Heper, 1976a, p. 517). These
former higher civil servants thought democracy required education, toler-
ance, and self-discipline on the part of politicians; in their opinion, politi-
cians in Turkey did not have such qualifications (Heper, 1976a, p. 515). At
the time, the bureaucratic elite in Turkey were also of the opinion that poli-
ticians in Turkey hindered national development (Roos & Roos, 1971, pp.
168ff). Thus, they did not look with sympathy at the differentiation of the
roles of political and bureaucratic elite and a careful delineation of the
respective areas of professional competence. For them, loyalty to their
self-designated mission of the bureaucracy—that of safeguarding
Atatürkian principles—had greater significance than merit—efficient
implementation of policies adopted by politicians. Thus, their Bonapar-
tism was coupled with strong doses of patrimonialism.
With the coming to power from 1950 onward of such antistate parties
as the Democratic Party, the Justice Party, and the True Path Party, the
problematique, as the new political elite perceived it, became those of first
destatizing and then politicizing the bureaucracy. Thus, efforts were made
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to render the bureaucracy responsive to the constitutive system, but not to
make it more efficient.
For a while, the bureaucrats tried to resist such encroachments to their
traditional autonomy and worldview (Heper, 1976b; Heper, Kim, & Pai,
1980). In fact, the 1960 and 1971 military interventions were made by
officers who shared the bureaucrats’ statist vision in question; in each
case, the latter removed from power anti-Atatürkian governments (Harris,
1988).
In the long run, this was a hopeless struggle against governments now
more than ever determined to put an end to the supremacy of the Bona-
partist cadres in the Turkish polity. The result was either the virtually com-
plete politicization of the bureaucracy such that bureaucrats not only lost
their neutrality but also competence, or a resort to bureau-
pathology—overemphasis on rules and regulations to block effective
action by politicians (Heper, 1977).
As noted, in post-1983 Turkey, the Motherland Party (MP) govern-
ments under Turgut Özal tried to transform the partially legal rational and
partially patrimonial bureaucracy into a rational-productive one (Heper,
1989). Yet, the efforts to render the bureaucracy into a rational-productive
one too had patrimonial overtones. Many of the appointments to the upper
reaches of the bureaucracy were not based solely on an objective assess-
ment of merit. It is true that in the short run the new bureaucratic cadres
contributed to the successful economic performance of the MP govern-
ments. However, as appointments were not made strictly with a view to
merit, some appointees turned out to be virtually complete failures.
Although few in number, appointees were partly responsible for the even-
tual demise of the MP governments. Patrimonialism further increased in
the post-Özal period.
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAM AND
THE NEW PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY
THE POST-1983 STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAM
From 1983 onward, the MP governments in Turkey launched an ambi-
tious structural adjustment program that aimed at substituting an outward-
oriented export promotion policy for an inward-looking import-
substitution policy. This program of “radical transformation” aimed at an
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economy open to competition—in particular, the substitution of market
forces for administrative decisions for the determination of commodity
and factor prices, the partial liberalization of foreign trade, and the devel-
opment of the domestic financial market. The Price Control Commission
that in the past had, from time to time, interfered in the setting of the prices
of the goods and services of the state economic enterprises, which held a
monopolistic position, was abolished. The state economic enterprises
themselves were no longer fully subsidized. Negative real interest rates
were abandoned, and the Turkish lira ceased to be overvalued. Capital
markets were created. All controls on imports, except for duties, were
lifted, and considerable tariff reductions were made. Incentives were pro-
vided for exports through a flexible exchange rate policy and tax rebates
(Bütün yönleriyle Özal ve dönemi, 1993, p. 53; Devlet Planlama
TeÕkilat, 1989, pp. 1-2).
Turgut Özal played a critical role in devising and implementing the
structural adjustment program in question. In late 1979, as then Prime
Minister Süleyman Demirel’s chief aide,9 Özal prepared the January 24,
1980, Stabilization Program that paved the way to the structural adjust-
ment program. During the 1980 to 1983 military regime, for a time Özal
served as deputy prime minister in charge of economic affairs; he per-
suaded the military about the merits of the program he had initiated. With
the reinstallation of a multiparty government in 1983, Özal’s MP came to
office, and Özal became prime minister. He remained in that post until
1989 (when he became president).
The structural adjustment program gained full steam while Özal was
prime minister (Bütün yönleriyle Özal ve dönemi, 1993, p. 53). As noted,
Özal sought to achieve a radical transformation in the economic sphere,
along with far-reaching changes in other areas necessary to bring about
the transformation in question. One of those areas was the public
bureaucracy.
The New Public Bureaucracy
Not unexpectedly, Özal found the bureaucracy unable to keep pace
with, and in any case not sympathetic to, the transformation he had in
mind. As noted, some bureaucrats still had Bonapartist inclinations.
These bureaucrats wished the state to have a prominent role in the polity
and society, including extensive controls over the economy. In respect to
the economy, they were étatists. Others had sympathies toward the previ-
ous governments. In addition, as noted above and as Özal also thought,
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many of the bureaucrats did not have the necessary expertise or were too
steeped in their old ways to contribute to the structural adjustment pro-
gram adopted in the early 1980s (Kazdal, 1990, p. 190).10
According to Özal, the expertise in question meant not only neutrality
and efficiency (characteristics of a legal-rational bureaucrat) but also a
program-oriented (substantive) rationality (contribution to policy making
based on expert knowledge) and effectiveness (characteristics of a
rational-productive bureaucrat). In Özal’s opinion, the bureaucracy was
either too slow, not dynamic, and unresponsive to people’s demands, or
ideologically too committed to state intervention, not market oriented,
and too caught up in its procedural maze (Atiyas, 1996, p. 304). With a
view to these bureaucrats, Özal argued that Turkey’s greatest problem was
the tendency in particular on the part of the graduates of Ankara Universi-
ty’s School of Political Science to rule the country all by themselves.11
Özal also pointed out that when they deemed it necessary, these bureau-
crats sought the support of particular political forces.12 Turning to the
functioning of the bureaucracy, Özal noted that a salient characteristic of
the bureaucracy was that of red tape, leading to inefficiency,13 and the
dominant characteristic of the individual bureaucrat was his or her conser-
vative approach (Barlas, 1994, p. 118).
Program-oriented expertise, openness to innovation, andiÕbitiri-
cilik—“the ability to get things done”—were the primary qualities Özal
sought in bureaucrats (Barlas, 1994, p. 116).¤Õbitiricilik was taken as an
antidote to the bureaucratic pathology. As Özal placed great emphasis on
the ability to get things done, he in fact expected the bureaucrats to effec-
tively implement policies at all costs. This came out quite clearly from a
confession he once made: “As we tried to give priority to the substance and
not to the procedure, we sometimes came to the brink of violating the law”
(Cemal, 1989, p. 116).14On one occasion, Özal even said, “No harm would
be done by violating the Constitution once” (Bura, 1994, p. 164).
Özal also thought that politicians with the qualities he sought in
bureaucrats were in great scarcity in his own party.15 At the time the MP
was founded (1983), the military regime then still in power had not given
its endorsement to that party. The military had popularity among the peo-
ple because it had “saved the country from chaos and anarchy” (Hale,
1994, p. 247). Consequently, many qualified people had not expected a
MP victory at the polls and had not joined that party.
In Özal’s estimation, the scarcity of qualified politicians in the MP
made it all the more necessary to have innovative bureaucrats with
program-oriented expertise who could function effectively as well as
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efficiently. As he had reservations about the bureaucracy he had inherited,
whenever possible Özal closely worked with those politicians who had the
said qualities. Among these politicians were Ekrem Pakdemirli, Adnan
Kahveci, and Hüsnü Doan; they were all considered by Özal as very
“intelligent” (Gökmen, 1992, pp. 114, 217, 219-220). Among the three,
Kahveci had a special status; Özal had complete trust in him (Gökmen,
1992, p. 220). It must be noted in passing that intellectuals, politicians,
and bureaucrats who had different political views, too, had great respect
for Kahveci.16
The scarcity of such qualified politicians, however, obliged Özal to
bring the bureaucracy into the picture as well. Here Özal worked with
some selected agencies and units in the economic bureaucracy, having
separated the said agencies and units from others. He created a number of
autonomous units within the existing agencies. Such a unit was, for
instance, created within the State Planning Organization and made
responsible for the southeastern Anatolia Project. In addition, Özal trans-
ferred what he considered to be critical functions from an existing agency
to a newly created one. For example, the newly established Undersecretar-
iat for the Treasury and Foreign Trade was affiliated to the Prime Ministry
as part of Özal’s efforts to bring some critical agencies of the economic
bureaucracy under his own direct control and was given the responsibility
of devising and implementing economic, financial, and monetary poli-
cies; the Ministry of Finance was left with the responsibility of collecting
public revenues. Özal also brought some key already existing agencies
under the closer control of the government. For instance, the Central Bank
was rendered less autonomous (Heper, 1990, p. 611).
In addition, Özal brought to the heads of the units and agencies in ques-
tion people from outside the bureaucracy; many of the latter were edu-
cated in the United States. He preferred outsiders to insiders because “the
former were people who were not tainted with the bad habits” of the latter,
and also, they had connections, particularly in the United States. To Özal,
those connections were important because he aimed at fully integrating
Turkish economy with Western economies. The outsiders were expected
to help Özal have an effective liaison with such organizations as the Inter-
national Monetary Fund and the World Bank, as well as the European
Union and the Council of Europe. Theseprensler(princes), as they had
been called, were to report directly to the prime minister.17
Most of the outsiders Özal brought to the heads of selected units and
agencies in the economic bureaucracy were engineers by profession. Özal
equated engineers’ logic with rationality. This was in line with the general
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perception in Turkey about engineers’ being realists who easily solved
problems. In Turkey, until recently, students of social sciences have had
basically a normative-utopian approach at the expense of an empiricist-
analytical approach. The normative-utopian approach in question par-
tially derived from the fact that, as noted, in Turkey, until recently there
has been a very sharp rift between the state and society. For several centu-
ries, the state elite have preoccupied themselves with the salvation of the
state and showed little interest in how the society functioned (Mardin,
1973). They thought they could easily manipulate the society by regula-
tion from above (Mardin, 1980, pp. 44-45). Consequently, their prescrip-
tions often had little affinity with reality, and sometimes even bordered on
utopia.18The flourishing of a utopian approach was also due to the fact that
in the Ottoman Empire, for centuries the dominating tradition was
unquestioned theological belief (Kazamias, 1966, p. 223). In the Republi-
can period, dogmas that held a sway on the intellectual faculties of the
many members of the intelligentsia derived first from an ideological ver-
sion of Atatürkism that took it as a political manifesto rather than as a
worldview or a mentality—to act rationally and not to take religious tenets
as one’s decisional premises (And, 1956, p. 25)—and secondly from the
hard ideologies of rightist and especially leftist variety (Landau, 1974;
Ülgener, 1983).
Under the circumstances, to many, students of natural sciences in gen-
eral and engineers in particular seemed to be realists with an ability to
effectively solve problems. It is true that several persons with a natural sci-
ence background also subscribed first to the ideological version of
Atatürkism and then to the said hard ideologies (Göle, 1986, pp. 86ff); yet,
because their ideological orientations could not be reflected in what they
wrote or did as part of their profession, these people were considered not
to have utopian inclinations.
Beginning with the 1930s, engineers joined the ranks of the elites in
increasing numbers (Göle, 1986, pp. 83-86). Then, from the 1950s
onward, engineering became a very prestigious profession in Turkey. Sev-
eral graduates of Istanbul Technical University,19 including Özal and
Demirel, began to join the bureaucratic and political cadres.
Here, the case of the Turkish Export-Import Bank is a telling example.
The Turkish Banking Code required that the head of this bank should have
at least an undergraduate degree in economics, finance, or banking. To cir-
cumvent this provision and bring another engineer, Turgut Özkan, to the
head of this bank, Özal government appointed Özkan as the Acting
Director-General of the Turkish Export-Import Bank (Kozanolu, 1993,
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pp. 201-206). The respect for engineers was so high that the exceptionally
successful director of the Central Bank, RüÕdü Saracolu, was, in fact,
referred to as “money engineer,” even though Saracolu had a Ph.D.
degree in economics.20
Patrimonial Rational Productivity
One may argue that the restructuring in the upper reaches of the Turk-
ish economic bureaucracy, effected by the Özal governments, began to
transform that bureaucracy into a structure that resembled a rational-
productive one—a bureaucracy that provides specialized input to public
policy making and effectively implements the policies adopted by politi-
cians. For instance, the newly established High Coordination Council of
Economic Affairs, founded in 1981 and made up of politicians and top
bureaucrats, sped up the decision-making process vis-à-vis economic
issues and became instrumental in the emergence of a harmonious rela-
tionship between the minister of state responsible for economic affairs on
one hand and the heads of such critical agencies as the State Planning
Organization, the Undersecretariat of Treasury and Foreign Trade, and the
Central Bank on the other.21
Policy implementation also picked up pace. For instance, the export
promotion policy that involved granting tax rebates to the exporters was
carried out quite effectively by the General Directorate of Incentives and
Implementation, which was first affiliated with the State Planning Organi-
zation and then with the Prime Ministry. Between 1980 and 1990, Tur-
key’s exports increased at the annual average rate of 15.8% in U.S. dollar
terms (State Planning Organization, 1992, p. 1). During this period, the
value of exports increased from U.S. $2.9 billion to U.S. $13.0 billion
(U.S. dollars) (Atiyas, 1996, p. 293).22
Also, at the time, Turkish economy experienced significant transfor-
mation and growth. The trade, finance, and banking sectors made gains at
the expense of the sectors in the manufacturing industry. Whereas in 1980
the share of the production sector in the gross fixed investments was
34.7%, in 1989 it dropped to 14.5%. Also, the share of the service sectors
in the gross fixed investments rose from 38.7% to 63.8%. The correspond-
ing figures for education, health, tourism, and transport were 1.3% and
3.2%, 0.9% and 1.3%, 0.5% and 4.2%, and 14.8% and 18.4%, respectively
(Devlet Planlama TeÕkilat, 1990, p. 35). These structural changes in the
economy were paralleled by an annual average GDP growth rate of 5.5%
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between 1980 and 1990.23 In addition, exports went up from U.S. $2,910
million in 1980 to U.S.$11,771 million in 1989 (Devlet Planlama TeÕki-
lat, 1990, pp. 28, 42).24
As already noted, these achievements were due not only to the organ-
izational restructuring of the economic bureaucracy that led to a more
effective implementation of policies, but also to the rather satisfactory
performance on the part of some of the engineer princes (Cemal, 1989, p.
148). Some nonengineer princes, too, significantly contributed to the suc-
cess of Özal’s policies. One of the latter group of bureaucrats was the
money engineer Saracolu who, as noted, had been the Director of the
Central Bank (from 1986 to 1993). Saracolu had been instrumental in
enabling the bank to gain considerable stature in the economic system. He
was known for his strong support for the liberalization of the economy. To
that end, Saracolu saw to it that his bank kept the Turkish lira stabilized.
To the extent possible, Saracolu avoided making short-term treasury
advances to the government. Consequently, he prevented inflation from
getting completely out of control. Saracolu had also been instrumental
in maintaining the flexible exchange rate policy adopted in 1981, particu-
larly by establishing a foreign exchange market and by further monetariz-
ing the Turkish economy. He achieved this by making sure that money
supply was essentially determined by open market operations (1987)25and
by establishing a gold market (1989).26
Another such nonengineer wizard was CoÕkun Ulusoy, who served as
the director general of the state-owned Agricultural Bank, one of Turkey’s
largest banks. During his term as director, the bank became a competitive
commercial bank (Ada, 1991, p. 137). Already in 1988, the bank had prof-
its higher than the average profits of other banks. It has been reported that
in 1988 the bank had brought to zero all of the nonperforming loans it held
(Ada, 1991, pp. 134-152). Ulusoy also successfully stood against political
patronage appointments in his bank (Milliyet, 1994).
The other side of the coin was that all this was achieved without much
regard to the bureaucratic norms and propriety. As noted, in some cases
appointments to the heads of the critical agencies were not solely based on
an objective assessment of the candidate’s level of skill and knowledge. If
a person was personally known by Özal, or by his wife and particularly by
his son, Ahmet Özal, he or she could be brought to a an important post.
Despite the fact that Ahmet Özal had no official position, during the 1980s
he was in effect the most important figure behind the appointments of the
key economic bureaucrats. The majority of the princes recruited from
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abroad were Ahmet Özal’s friends.27Besides being Ahmet Özal’s friend, it
was all the better if the candidate for prince had also an engineering
degree. If the person both had an engineering degree and was also a rela-
tive, it was even better. For instance, Özal’s brother Yusuf Özal, with a
degree in electrical engineering, was appointed as undersecretary of the
State Planning Organization. Only in exceptional cases a person who had
previously proven his ability in the bureaucracy was appointed to the head
of a critical agency. Two examples here are Ali Tigrel and Turgay Özkan.
Yet even Tigrel’s and Özkan’s cases are not clear-cut because Tigrel28 was
personally known by Özal and by Özal’s brother Yusuf Özal and Özkan29
by Ahmet Özal.
Under the circumstances, whether persons who were placed in charge
of critical agencies would perform well was left to chance factors. Many
did well. Obvious examples were Saracolu and Ulusoy. But then there
were complete failures like BülentÔemiler, another close friend of Ahmet
Özal.Ôemiler was first appointed director-general of the Turkish Housing
Bank and then was transferred to other posts before he had to resign
because of the charges of impropriety (in the handling of public funds)
made against him. Eventually he was convicted by court. Another exam-
ple was Engin Civan, who also served as director general of the Turkish
Housing Bank and who, as noted, was also convicted by court on charges
of corruption. Özal’s version of iÕbitiricilik—getting things done—often
led to going around rules. In the process, established rules and norms were
given short shrift, and as noted, in some cases even criminal offenses were
committed.
It follows that Özal’s strategy of transforming the economic bureaucracy
in a rational-productive direction had strong doses of patrimonialism.
Özal could easily adopt such a strategy because legal rationality had not
taken firm hold in Turkish bureaucracy. This strategy further weakened
the already feeble legal rationality of the bureaucracy. Not unlike their
ultimate protégé Turgut Özal, the princes appointed to key positions in the
economic bureaucracy were not very careful in conforming to bureau-
cratic norms—for instance, they jumped echelons, and at times, they were
impatient with rules and regulations. Furthermore, Özal himself and the
politicians in Özal’s close entourage had, on the whole, little respect for
nonprince bureaucrats. Consequently, the autonomy of particularly those
bureaucratic agencies that were not led by prince bureaucrats was further
undermined (Evin, 1996, p. 51). The patrimonialism that informed the
appointments of the princes placed into peril the institutionalization of
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rational productivity in the bureaucracy. The cases of corruption that
involved some of the princes facilitated in the post-Özal period some fur-
ther reversal from the practice of appointing bureaucrats on the basis of
merit, measured by a bureaucrat’s program-oriented expertise and
effectiveness.
The Post-Özal Period
Concerning the appointments to the key positions to the economic
bureaucracy, the post-Özal governments have not adopted the model of
recruiting engineers from abroad. The governments in question preferred
to make such appointments basically from within the economic bureaucracy
and from among those without an engineering background. For instance,
Yaman Törüner, who served as the director of the Central Bank from Feb-
ruary 1994 until October 1995, was a graduate of Ankara University’s
School of Political Science and had worked at that bank from 1972 until
1987 and in the economic bureaucracy until 1990. His successor, Gazi
Erçel, came from the Treasury (when the Treasury was part of the Ministry
of Finance). Similarly, the undersecretary of the SPO from 1993 to 1997,
Necati Özfrat, another nonengineer, had worked in the SPO since 1968.
In the post-Özal period, among those who headed the Undersecretariat of
the Treasury and Foreign Trade for a long time were Tevfik Altnok and
Ayfer Ylmaz, both of whom were brought to this post from the Ministry
of Finance; Osman Ünsal, who once was at the SPO (before taking up jobs
at private banks); and Osman Birsel, previously the undersecretary of the
Prime Ministry.
Thus, in the post-Özal period, there was a general tendency to appoint
to the upper reaches of the bureaucracy insiders who were not engineers
and some of whom did not have program-oriented expertise (Evin, 1996).
Another characteristic of this period was that, as compared to the Özal era,
there seems to have been an increase in the improper handling of funds by
bureaucrats (as well as politicians) (Evin, 1996). Also, because of the
appointments from inside the bureaucracy and because of the increased
politicization of the bureaucracy, the quality of the persons in the top posi-
tions seemed to have experienced a decline. One evidence here was that,
as compared to the Özal period, in the 1990s there was a higher turnover
among the key higher civil servants. Politicians were more frequently
obliged to sack their favorites in the top bureaucratic positions as a conse-
quence of serious doubts voiced especially in the media about the
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program-oriented expertise of the bureaucrats in question. One such
bureaucrat was Ünsal. He had been recruited by Prime Minister Tansu
Çiller, who had declared that Ünsal constituted “half of her brain.”30
Doubts about the key bureaucrats of this period having the appropriate
expertise were due to the acceleration of inflation and the skyrocketing of
the public sector borrowing in the first part of the 1990s. Whereas in 1989,
the inflation rate was 63.3%, in 1994 it rose to 106.3%, and in 1995 to
93.6% (Devlet Planlama TeÕkilat, 1996, p. 90). Similarly, whereas in
1989, the ratio of public sector borrowing requirement to GNP was 5.3%,
in 1991 it increased to 10.2%, in 1992 to 10.6%, and in 1993 to 12.2%.
Despite the fact that in 1994 a stabilization program was adopted, that year
this ratio was still 8.1%, and in 1995, 6.7% (Devlet Planlama TeÕkilat,
1996, pp. 53-54). It should also be noted that foreign reserves of the Cen-
tral Bank decreased from U.S. $7.2 billion in November 1993 to U.S. $3
billion in April 1995. Between January and April 1995, the currency
depreciated by 150% (Atiyas, 1996, p. 303).
If the economy in the first part of the 1990s did not fare even worse, it
was due to the efforts of a few isolated top bureaucrats who had either
climbed to those positions from the ranks or had been recruited from the
private sector.31 Not unlike others, these few isolated bureaucrats, too, had
earlier been close to politicians and/or they had the right political creden-
tials; but unlike others, they happened to have the right expertise (Evin,
1996, pp. 50-51).
There is little reason to expect a weakening of patrimonialism in the
Turkish public bureaucracy in the near future. It is true that Turkey’s lin-
gering, although somewhat weakened, resolution to become a full mem-
ber of the European Union will continue to oblige governments in Turkey
to upgrade particularly the economic bureaucracy in both legal-rational
and rational-productive directions. Yet, with the coming to power of the
True Path Party-Prosperity Party (PP) coalition in June 1996, as compared
to the previous periods, public policies began to display equal if not higher
degrees of populism, in particular due to the political preferences of the
religiously oriented PP wing of the coalition government. The Prosperi-
tians have also attempted to pack the bureaucracy with their coreligionists,
without much regard to their qualifications and expertise. The said
approaches on the part of the Prosperitians have stood in the way of a fur-
ther transformation of the economic bureaucracy in Turkey either in a
legal-rational or rational-productive dimension.
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CONCLUSION
The extreme Bonapartist tendencies in the Ottoman-Turkish bureaucracy
prevented its being transformed into a legal-rational bureaucracy. When it
was destatized and then politicized by the antistate-oriented political par-
ties, the bureaucracy’s neutrality turned into responsiveness, but the
bureaucracy remained inefficient because the antistate-oriented political
parties paid attention to political loyalty but not merit.
In post-1980 Turkey, an attempt was made to render this politicized
bureaucracy, which evinced strong signs of patrimonialism, into a
rational-productive bureaucracy. Some agencies or units within particular
agencies were considered critical for the formulation and effective imple-
mentation of the structural adjustment program launched by the MP gov-
ernments. Outsiders (princes) were brought to the top positions in these
agencies and units. An effort was made to select the princes to the extent
possible from among engineers, because engineers were considered as
having a program-oriented expertise and the ability to implement policies
effectively as well as efficiently.
Yet, knowing someone personally was important in the selection of
outsiders. In some cases, this last factor contributed to the unsuccessful
performance and even corruption on the part of outsiders. The patrimonial
dimension of the efforts to turn the upper reaches of the Turkish public
bureaucracy into a rational-productive one undermined the efforts to
transform the bureaucracy in the said direction.
In such countries as France and Germany, where historically public
bureaucracies also had Bonapartist characteristics, the bureaucracies first
approximated the legal-rational bureaucratic model and only then took on
the characteristics of the rational-productive model. The transition in
question did not lead to the abandonment of the principle of the objective
assessment of merit in the bureaucracy. What changed was the nature of
the merit sought in bureaucrats; politics-oriented instrumental rationality
was replaced by program-oriented substantive rationality. In either case, a
patrimonial orientation did not continue to play a role in determining
merit. In Turkey, because of the unusually strong Bonapartism on the part
of the bureaucracy, a legal-rational public bureaucracy could never be
developed. Consequently, rational-productivity in Turkish bureaucracy
was tainted by a lingering patrimonialism, which undermined the institu-
tionalization of rational-productivity.
With a view to the Turkish case, we would like to suggest that legal
rationality is a prerequisite for the successful institutionalization of
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rational productivity. Whereas there is a zero-sum type of relationship
between patrimonialism on one hand and legal-rationality and rational-
productivity on the other, there is a positive-sum type of relationship
between legal rationality and rational productivity.
NOTES
1. The basic characteristics of the ideal type of legal-rational bureaucracy are (a) a
clearly defined sphere of competence subject to impersonal rules; (b) a rationally established
hierarchy; (c) a regular system of appointment, and promotion made with a view to merit;
and (d) technical training as a regular requirement. The corresponding characteristics of the
ideal type of patrimonial bureaucracy are a (a) conflicting series of tasks and powers, (b) ab-
sence of clear rules on who shall decide a matter or deal with appeals, (c) appointments and
promotions based on loyalty, and (d) lack of technical training as a regular requirement (We-
ber, 1978, pp. 212-241).
2. We take up rational-productive bureaucracy below.
3. The three bureaucratic models in question areideal types. When we talk about a fit
between them and actual bureaucracies, we refer to a situation where actual bureaucracies
approximate these ideal types.
4. The Bonapartist bureaucracy sees itself as the guardian of the general interest and,
therefore, acts unresponsively to disparate social interests and their political representatives.
Marx believed that in France, political power was in the hands of the bureaucratic state, and
consequently, Bonapartism was the central model in particular for his analysis of the rela-
tionship between classes and the state in France (Beetham, 1987, pp. 76, 79, 82; Krygier,
1979, pp. 46ff). Bonapartism continued to be used in this sense in the 20th century, too. For
instance, see Ehrmann (1968, pp. 8-9, 150, 202, 203, 234-235).
5. On these two concepts, we draw on Aberbach and Rockman (1994, pp. 461-463).
6. Here we refer to those bureaucrats involved in formulating and implementing eco-
nomic policy.
7. On the political inefficacy of the economic middle classes in Turkey, see Bura
(1994) and Heper (1991).
8. Atatürk was the founder of Turkey and its president from 1923 to 1938. Atatürkian
principles is composed of republicanism, nationalism, secularism, populism, étatism, and
reformism.
9. At the time, Özal was both Undersecretary of the Prime Ministry and Acting Under-
secretary (head) of the State Planning Organization.
10. Özal picked up and elaborated on the criticisms of bureaucracy that had been made
since the mid-1970s—that the bureaucracy could no longer contribute to the socioeconomic
development of Turkey and that, in fact, it had become a financial burden on the economy. In-
deed, increasingly far too many people worked in the bureaucracy; whereas in 1931, the
population per civil servant had been 197.7, in 1980 it dropped to 44. 7 (ÖmürgönülÕe ,
1995, p. 24). Moreover, many of these bureaucrats were unqualified and incompetent (inter
alia, Turkish Industrialists’ and Businesspersons’ Association, 1983).
11.Yüzyil Biterken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi(1996, p. 185). Until at
least the 1970s, the graduates of this school had a virtual monopoly at the highest echelons of
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the public bureaucracy in Turkey. See, inter alia, Szyliowicz (1971, pp. 371-398). (Mekteb-i
Mülkiyewas the older name of the School of Political Science in question.)
12.Yüzyil Biterken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi(1996, p. 185). Here Özal
must have had in mind the 1923 to mid-1960s Republican People’s Party and its successor
parties.
13. SeeBaÕbakan Turgut Özal’in birinci basin toplantyisi(1984, 8.2).
14. Cited in Cemal (1989, p. 116).
15. Our interview with Hasan Celal Güzel, Undersecretary of the Prime Ministry be-
tween 1983 and 1986, on May 2, 1994.
16. One such intellectual was Emre Kongar, who in the 1990s served as the undersecre-
tary of the Ministry of Culture when one of the Republican People’s Party’s successor par-
ties—the Social Democratic People’s Party—was a coalition member. In his memoirs, Kon-
gar (1996) relates how Kahveci, after his party (MP) had taken its place in the opposition
(1989), still supported those government policies he personally deemed appropriate (p. 242).
17. We return to princes below.
18. See, inter alia, Okyar, (1968, pp. 213-243). As Kazamias (1996) has pointed out,
“armchair discussions” devoid of analysis based on careful theory and empirical observation
was also the upshot of the education people received at both secondary and high schools in
Turkey (p. 147).
19. This university was opened in 1944.
20. The phrasemoney engineerwas coined by journalist Çekirge (1993).
21. Our interview with Ali Tigrel, Director of the State Planning Organization between
1987 and 1991, on May 9, 1994.
22. Here and below we are not assuming a one-to-one relationship between key eco-
nomic bureaucrats’ performance and the general state of the economy; however, it is patent
that there was a certain degree of relationship.
23. In the same time period, the respective figures for the EC had been 2.3% and, for the
EFTA, 2.4% (Devlet Planlama TekÕilati, 1990, p. 2).
24. It is widely believed that the increase in exports was basically due to better use of ca-
pacity rather than to the creation of new capacity.
25. On open market operations in Turkey, see Tigrel (1991, pp. 6-20).
26. On the gold market in Turkey, see Devlet Planlama Teskilati (1990, p. 21).
27.Yüzyil Biterken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi (1996, pp. 183, 184).
28. Our interview with Tigrel. Tigrel was a chemical engineer who joined the State Plan-
ning Organization (SPO) in 1969. Between 1971 and 1984, Tigrel worked at the oil refinery
plant Petkim, a state economic enterprise. In 1984, he again joined the SPO, and between
1988 and 1990, Tigrel served as the undersecretary of the SPO. In the post-Özal period,
among all the princes, Tigrel managed to serve in the bureaucracy longest, until summer
1996. His last position was that of the coordinator of Turkey’s relations with the European
Union. He left this job following the coming to power of the coalition government of the
religious-oriented Prosperity Party and the secular center-right True Path Party. Other
princes—few in number—who also continued to serve in the bureaucracy in the post-Özal
period did so until 1994 when one of them, Engin Civan, was found to be involved in a cor-
ruption case and was convicted. (The name of the Prosperity Party in Turkish isRefah Par-
tisi. Refahis usually rendered into English aswelfare, and this party is referred to in English
as the Welfare Party. Yet, in Turkish refah means prosperity and not welfare.)
29. Özkan was a Massachusetts Institute of Technology Ph.D. in electrical engineering.
For a while, he worked at the World Bank. Then, because he was personally known by Ahmet
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Özal, he was appointed as the general director of the Eximbank. Three of the assistant gen-
eral directors of the Eximbank were also engineers, one of them a Professor of Mechanical
Engineering.
30. Earlier, Ünsal was Professor Çiller’s student at Boaziçi University in Istanbul.
31. Some lateral transfers of managers from the private sector to governmental agencies
in this period was due to the increasingly challenging nature of the tasks facing the upper
reaches of the bureaucracy. See Evin (1996, p. 51).
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